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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been intense debate—within the judiciary,1 
academia,2 the press,3 even Congress4—over the legitimacy of using 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2016. I am grateful to Steven G. Calabresi, 
Akhil Reed Amar, and Philip C. Bobbitt for inspiration, as well as to Jack Sklarski and 
the editors of the Michigan State International Law Review for all of their support and 
assistance over the course of the production process. 
 1. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“[T]he stark reality 
[is] that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the 
laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand. . . .”); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The right the petitioners seek in this case has been 
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been 
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal 
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States 
choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they 
spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations 
decriminalize conduct.”) (emphasis in original); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court’s . . . jurisprudence should not impose 
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”); Foster, 537 U.S. at 992 (Breyer, J., 
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dissenting) (“Courts of other nations have found that delays of 15 years or less can render 
capital punishment degrading, shocking, or cruel.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
316 n.21 (2002) (“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing “the 
Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws”). 
 2. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 296 (2005) (“Foreign and international law cannot be 
legitimately used in an outcome-determinative way to decide questions of constitutional 
interpretation.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and the American Constitution, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 229 (2006) (“There is no . . . power in the judiciary to 
make any norm of international law binding within the United States.”); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329 (2003) (“We are the 
losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.”); David C. 
Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist . . . Sometimes, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1276 (2007) (“[T]he fundamental tenets of originalism commit its 
adherents to refer to foreign law when engaging a narrow band of constitutional 
questions.”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 131, 136 (2006) (“Our goal here is to set out a framework for assessing the question 
of whether courts should consult the practices of other states, either domestically or 
nationally.”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response 
to The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2007) (“[T]he Constitution 
itself ultimately refutes the notion that it should be interpreted by reference to the law of 
other states.”); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. 
L. REV. 185, 191 (2005) (“[C]ourts should never use . . . [foreign law] to any degree in 
instances where the specific disputes they consider . . . do not actually necessitate such a 
reference under the Constitution.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Editorial: Kagan’s Foreign Law Trumps Con-Law, Wash. Times 
(May 25, 2010), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/25/kagan-foreign-law-
trumps-con-law/ (“Solicitor General Elena Kagan’s nomination to the Supreme Court 
should founder unless she adequately explains why she quite literally put 
‘International/Comparative Law’ ahead of the U.S. Constitution.”); Daniel Terris, 
Sotomayor’s Cautious Openness to Foreign Laws, Boston Globe (July 16, 2009), 
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/07/16/sotomayors_ca
utious_openness_to_foreign_laws/ (“[A] burgeoning respect for judges and courts from 
overseas should help further the heartening idea that the United States is not a nation unto 
itself, but a nation among nations, working toward justice for its own citizenry and for 
men and women around the globe.”); Collin Levy, Sotomayor and International Law, 
Wall St. J. (July 14, 2009, 12:01 AM) www.wsj.com/articles/SB124753085258335815 
(“[U]sing foreign law as a guidepost or inspiration raises issues of both sovereignty and 
democracy by permitting jurists outside the U.S. system to guide the trajectory of our 
democracy.”); Sean D. Murphy, The Law of the Lands: Why US Courts Look Overseas, 
Boston Globe (June 5, 2005),  
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foreign law in American courts. This question cannot be answered, 
however, unless one knows what the relevant criteria for constitutional 
legitimacy are. By what standards should we decide whether it is 
appropriate for American courts to cite foreign law in their decisions? 
Before we can figure out whether it is constitutionally proper for 
American courts to use foreign law, we need to first agree on what makes 
something constitutionally proper. 
In a pair of path-breaking books, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the 
Constitution5 and Constitutional Interpretation,6 Philip C. Bobbitt offers 
a modal approach to constitutional argument, presenting six different 
types, or modalities, through which constitutional discourse is channeled. 
They are appeals from text, history, doctrine, prudence, structure, and 
ethos.7 According to Bobbitt, this taxonomy of argumentative forms 
resolves the counter-majoritarian dilemma by showing that there was no 
dilemma in the first place.8 Judicial review is legitimated, he says, by our 
  
www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/ 
06/05/the_law_of_the_lands/ (“Today, the continued development of US constitutional 
law can benefit from the experiences of other countries. Without abdicating sovereignty, 
we can learn from other countries’ successes and failures.”). 
 4. For instance, Congressman Ted Poe has observed that Americans “spilled 
their blood . . . to sever ties with England forever,” but says that “[n]ow, justices in this 
land of America . . . use British court decisions . . . in interpreting our Constitution. What 
the British could not accomplish by force, our Supreme Court has surrendered to them 
voluntarily.” 151 Cong. Rec. H3105 (daily ed. May 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Poe). 
Meanwhile, Senator John Cornyn has warned that “the American people may be slowly 
losing control over the meaning of our laws and of our Constitution,” and that “foreign 
governments may even begin to dictate what our laws and our Constitution mean, and 
what our policies in America should be.” 151 Cong. Rec. S3109 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Cornyn). In 2004, the House of Representatives considered a 
resolution expressing its “sense . . . that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of 
the laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, 
or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless” they “are incorporated into the 
legislative history of laws passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States 
or otherwise inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United 
States.” H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 5. PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982). 
 6. PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
 7. Id. at 12–13. 
 8. Id. at 8 (“[J]udicial review is one of those by no means rare issues in 
constitutional law that presents an easy case. . . . It was the attempt to meet this 
[Countermajoritarian] Objection that generated my description and discussion of six 
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adherence to these forms of constitutional reasoning; we accept law 
arguments that sound in one or more of these modalities as legitimate, 
but we reject things that purport to be constitutional claims yet which 
don’t take at least one of these six modal forms.9 Though the six 
modalities allow for distinctions to be drawn between different types of 
constitutional assertions, the important thing about them is not that they 
allow us to classify constitutional arguments, but rather that they enable 
us to distinguish bona fide constitutional arguments from arguments that 
simply are not constitutional in character. 
This Article will attempt to evaluate the legitimacy of the practice of 
comparative constitutional law by American courts through modal 
lenses. It will ask one question—is it legitimate for our judges to cite 
foreign law?—six times, each time analyzing it within a particular modal 
framework; textual, historical, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and 
ethical. Using those methodological tools, it will then seek to provide 
one answer. It is important to understand what this Article will not do; it 
will not attempt to evaluate the usefulness of comparative constitutional 
law within the various modalities. Whether it makes sense to present a 
comparative law claim as a textual assertion, or a doctrinal assertion, or 
so on—whether comparative law arguments are more persuasive when 
they take particular modal forms—is beyond the scope of this Article. 
The sole question is whether, evaluated as a modal matter, it is 
constitutionally permissible to use foreign law. 
Many of the arguments explored below will be familiar ones, raised 
by prominent jurists and scholars in favor or against the citation of 
foreign law. This Article makes no claim to the originality of most of 
these arguments. Rather, it attempts to categorize these arguments by the 
types of reasoning they use—textual, historical, doctrinal, prudential, 
structural, or ethical—and thus demonstrate how the citation of foreign 
law can be either legitimated or illegitimated within the various modal 
frameworks. The arguments themselves, with some original exceptions, 
belong to others. By presenting them in this taxonomical framework, this 
Article seeks to identify how a textualist, or a historicist, or a doctrinalist, 
  
modalities of constitutional argument. . . . [That] maintained the legitimacy of judicial 
review.”). 
 9. See id. (The modalities “maintained the legitimacy of judicial review in the 
United States.”). 
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or so on, would go about evaluating the question of whether the citation 
of foreign law by American judges is legitimate. 
I. THE PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTION AND BOBBITT’S MODAL 
TAXONOMY 
In Constitutional Fate10 and Constitutional Interpretation,11 Bobbitt 
lays out a vision of what he calls the “participatory Constitution.”12 
Bobbitt distinguishes his approach from those of the legal formalists and 
the legal realists, both of whom implicitly accept an assumption that “the 
statement of a legal rule is either true or false depending on whether it 
stands for a legal fact.”13 Formalists, he says, simply believe that law is a 
thing we have and excluding “inconsistent decisions as wrongly 
decided,”14 while realists believe that the “mass of contradictory 
statements” in what judges do means that we don’t really have law at 
all.15 Either way, both camps “treat[] legal rules as if they derived their 
validity from the truths they express about a world.”16 
Bobbitt rejects this approach. The stuff of law, he says, is not factual 
propositions about the state of the world that have a definite truthful 
character.17 Instead, he says, it “consists of resolving questions in the 
context of the conventions that provide the methods for answering 
them.”18 Law, according to Bobbitt, “is something we do, not something 
we have as a consequence of something we do.”19 It is expressed in “the 
formulation of rules,” or modalities of interpretation, “and not 
propositions,” or legal fact-statements.20 The modalities, Bobbitt 
believes, are conventions within which disputes over the compatibility of 
particular laws with the Constitution can be resolved, but they arise from 
a relationship between the Constitution itself and “the larger culture with 
  
 10. BOBBITT, supra note 5. 
 11. BOBBITT, supra note 6. 
 12. See BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 235. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 234–35. 
 18. Id. at 236. 
 19. BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 24 (emphasis added). 
 20. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 236. 
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whom the various constitutional functions serve to assure a fluid, two-
way effect on the ongoing process of constitutional meaning.”21 
Constitutional meaning, then, is constructively negotiated through the 
practice of argument and appeal made within the proper forms.22 
These forms, what Bobbitt calls modalities, are textualism, 
historicisim, doctrinalism, prudentialism, structuralism, and ethicism—
appeals to the Constitution’s text, history, doctrine, prudence, structure 
and ethos. There is no order of operations inherent in use of the 
modalities; there is no rule by which conflicting modal appeals are 
reconciled or held to trump one another.23 Rather, conflict between the 
modalities creates “a legitimate role for conscience” in our system of 
constitutional decision-making—”an opportunity for justice consistent 
with the freedom of the conscience to decide matters.”24 This Article’s 
task will be to evaluate the legitimacy of the citation of foreign law 
through the lenses of these modalities. But first, a brief introduction to 
each of these modal forms. 
Textual argument relies on “a consideration of the present sense of the 
words of the provision” in question.25 They “rest on a sort of ongoing 
social contract, whose terms are given their contemporary meanings 
continually reaffirmed by the refusal of the People to amend the 
instrument.”26 Justice Joseph Story said that “there can be no security to 
the people in any constitution of government if they are not to judge of it 
by the fair meaning of the words in the text.”27 One appeal of textualism 
is its democratic pedigree; ordinary people may know little about case 
law or the historical debates that occurred at the time the Constitution 
was created, but anyone can read the text. “Constitutions,” Story said, 
  
 21. Id. at 234–35. 
 22. See Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s 
Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 157, 157 (2008) (Bobbitt 
asserts, “the Constitution is not an artifact that exists in some space apart from us; whose 
nature we might better search out by poking, teasing, or holding up to the proper light. 
Rather the Constitution is the search: it is neither more nor less than the practice . . . of 
constitutional law.”). 
 23. See generally BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 141–54. 
 24. Id. at 163. 
 25. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 7. 
 26. Id. at 26. 
 27. 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 407, at 390 
n.10 (Joseph Story ed. 1st ed. 1833). 
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“are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business 
of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and 
fitted for common understanding. The people make them; the people 
adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them.”28 Professor 
Akhil Amar notes that the entirety of the Constitution’s text runs fewer 
than 8,000 words, “a half hour’s read for the earnest citizen”; in this way, 
it actively “invites us to explore its substance.”29 
Historical argument “marshals the intent of the draftsmen of the 
Constitution and the people who adopted the Constitution.”30 They 
“depend on a determination of the original understanding of the 
constitutional provision to be construed.”31 Animating the historical 
modality is the notion “that the Constitution bound government and that 
the People had therefore devised a construction by which they could 
enforce its limits and rules.”32 Bobbitt believes that historical argument is 
most useful “to negative a particular interpretation but not to establish a 
single meaning conclusively.”33 To approach a constitutional question 
within the historical modality, one might ask whether “the framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended, or did not intend, or that 
it cannot be ascertained whether it was their intention,” a certain thing.34 
What we today call originalism is historical argument.35 
Doctrinal argument “asserts principles derived from precedent or from 
judicial or academic commentary on precedent.”36 The selection of on-
point precedents, the fashioning of general principles from multiple 
individual cases—these are in service of a desire to achieve principled, 
consistent, predictable decision-making. Doctrinal argument is often 
“almost wholly based on precedent and is derived from the doctrines that 
have accreted around various constitutional provisions.”37 Doctrinal 
appeals are rooted in the notion of “rule of law,” and contain “at least 
  
 28. Id. § 451, at 436–37. 
 29. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY xi (2005). 
 30. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 7. 
 31. Id. at 9. 
 32. Id. at 10. 
 33. Id. at 21. 
 34. BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 13. 
 35. See generally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. 
Calabresi ed.) (2007). 
 36. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 7. 
 37. Id. at 41.  
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two clear distinction. First, legislative policy making must be 
distinguished from judicial rule applying.”38 Second, and perhaps even 
more importantly, “judicial rule applying must be a reasoned process of 
deriving the appropriate rules and following them in deciding any 
practical controversy between adverse parties without regard to any fact 
not relevant to the rules.”39 
Prudential argument, meanwhile, is “constitutional argument which is 
actuated by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the 
decision.”40 It “is self-conscious to the reviewing institution and need not 
treat the merits of the particular controversy . . . instead advancing 
particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the courts 
in a particular way.”41 Sometimes, this means refraining from deciding a 
matter altogether; this is what Bobbitt means when he says that “a court’s 
first responsibility is to decide whether it should decide.”42 To avoid 
adjudicating cases and controversies on the merits, prudentialist judges 
may employ the tools of “discretionary standing, the grant of certiorari 
and the dismissal of appeal, the doctrines of vagueness, ripeness, and 
political question, and others.”43 
Structural arguments involve “inferences from the existence of 
constitutional structures and the relationships which the Constitution 
ordains among these structures.”44 They assert “that a particular principle 
or practical result is implicit in the structures of government and the 
relationships that are created by the Constitution among citizens and 
governments.”45 Unlike prudential arguments, structure appeals “are 
largely factless and depend on deceptively simple logical moves from the 
entire Constitutional text rather than from one of its parts.”46 Bobbitt 
describes structural appeals as “embody[ing] a macroscopic 
prudentialism drawing not on the peculiar facts of the case but rather 
arising from general assertions about power and social choice.”47 
  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 61. 
 41. Id. at 7. 
 42. Id. at 63. 
 43. Id. at 66. 
 44. Id. at 74. 
 45. Id. at 7. 
 46. Id. at 74. 
 47. Id. 
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Structuralism is associated with the person credited as having first 
articulated it, Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.48 
Finally, ethical argument “denotes an appeal to those elements of the 
American cultural ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.”49 Bobbitt 
identifies “[t]he fundamental American constitutional ethos” as “the idea 
of limited government, the presumption of which holds that all residual 
authority remains in the private sphere.”50 Unlike Lochnerism, which 
limits the ends that governments may pursue, arguments from ethos are 
directed at the impermissible means by which governments may pursue 
ends that are indisputably legitimate.51 Appeals to ethos “do not depend 
on the construction of any particular piece of text, but rather on the 
necessary relationships that can be inferred from the overall arrangement 
expressed in the text.”52 Ethical arguments are rooted in “the fundamental 
constitutional arrangement by which rights, in the American system, can 
be defined as those choices beyond the power of government to 
compel.”53 
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF CITING FOREIGN LAW AS A MODAL MATTER 
Now that the Bobbitt modalities have been introduced, it is time to 
evaluate whether the citation of foreign law is internally legitimate 
within each of them. 
A. Text 
Is it ever constitutionally legitimate to use foreign sources of law to 
interpret the U.S. Constitution? To answer this question, a textualist 
would begin, unsurprisingly, by looking to the Constitution’s text. On its 
face the Constitution doesn’t seem to authorize the citation of foreign 
law. No provision in it expressly allows its interpreters to rely on foreign 
law. This stands in contrast to South Africa’s 1996 constitution, which 
  
 48. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
 49. BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 20. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 147–54. 
 52. BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 20. 
 53. Id. 
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expressly says that courts, tribunals and forums “may consider foreign 
law”54 when interpreting the Bill of Rights. To a certain type of 
textualist, the absence of any similar provision in the U.S. Constitution 
would be dispositive—citing foreign law is impermissible. 
A textualist may be tempted to conclude that the Constitution bars 
using foreign law in interpreting itself based on an inference drawn from 
Article VI, which says that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”55 The inference would be that 
because Article VI provides an exhaustive enumeration of what counts as 
the “supreme Law of the Land”56—namely, the Constitution, federal 
laws, and treaties—anything that isn’t the Constitution, a federal law, or 
a treaty therefore can’t be the supreme law of the land.  
But this argument would misunderstand the question. Almost nobody 
believes that foreign law ought to be considered the law of the land qua 
foreign law, any more than we believe that law review articles ought to 
be considered the law of the land qua law review articles, or that treatises 
ought to be considered the law of the land qua treatises; these are all 
materials that can help us understand what, precisely, the Constitution 
means when it says something, not materials that are themselves the 
Constitution.57 In other words, citing Article VI only pushes the 
underlying issue up one level into a different realm of abstraction; 
instead of asking whether foreign law is of a hierarchically equal statute 
to American law (which, again, is a straw man question), we are asking 
whether foreign law can help us understand what American law means.  
So the Constitution’s text doesn’t overtly speak to the propriety of 
citing foreign law one way or the other. Does that mean that relying on 
foreign law is illegitimate as a matter of textualism? Perhaps not; there 
  
 54. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1)(c). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. 
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice 
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 541 (2005) (quoting Justice Stephen Breyer) 
(“Yet I read and refer to treatises and I read and refer to law review articles. My opinion 
is meant to reflect my actual method of reaching a legal conclusion; and references to 
those legal materials that had significance and will help the reader understand.”). 
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may be another way to think about the question, one that relies not on 
explicit textual commands or prohibitions, but on the implicit invitation 
to rely on foreign law that inheres in the text’s ambiguities. Friedrich 
Waismann famously observed that language has an “open texture” to it, 
so that “we can never fill up all the possible gaps through which a doubt 
may seep in.”58 He followed in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein,59 
who “believed that when we make an intelligible statement in a 
language, there is no abstract or ‘superlative fact’ that can govern the 
formation of the statement other than the language in which the 
statement is made.”60  
In the legal context, the open-textured nature of language means that 
rules are often “usable in cases that had not been anticipated by the 
original legislators, and perhaps even contrary to the legislators’ 
intentions.”61 Law’s open texture derives from the indeterminacy that 
results from “the judge (or legal community) being unable to give any 
principled reasons why a particular case ought to be subsumed under one 
rule rather than another.”62 H.L.A. Hart wrote that with law, as with 
language in general, “uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid 
for the use of general classifying terms.”63 When legal formalists attempt 
  
 58. Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, 19 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY 
VOLUME 119, 123 (1945). See also Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: 
Some Philosophical Issues, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 509, 522 (1994) (“A number of philosophers 
have speculated that vagueness is in principle ineliminable because it is possible to 
envisage puzzling borderline cases for every predicate we define.”). 
 59. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 134 (1992); see also 
BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 16 (1993) (“Waismann agreed 
with Wittgenstein that our concepts are not completely defined/fully 
delimited/completely verifiable, that this ‘ideal’ could not be reached, and that this 
‘deficiency’ had no negative consequences for our use of language under normal 
circumstances.”) (citations omitted). 
 60. Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of 
Recognition, 52 SMU L. REV. 75, 92 (1999). See also G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, 
WITTGENSTEIN: RULES, GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY 171–72 (1985) (“The pivotal point in 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on following rules is that a rule is internally related to acts which 
accord with it. The rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct.” (citation 
omitted)); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 192 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 2d ed. 1958). 
 61. Steve Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck: Scientific Realism and the 
Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 564 (1988). 
 62. Id. 
 63. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (3d ed. 2012). 
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to “freeze the meaning of the rule so that its general terms must have the 
same meaning in every case where its application is in question,”64 he 
says,  
[they] settl[e] in advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only 
reasonably be settled when they arise and are identified . . . includ[ing] 
in the scope of a rule cases which we would wish to exclude in order to 
give effect to reasonable social aims, and which the open-textured 
terms of our language would have allowed us to exclude, had we left 
them less rigidly defined.65 
The Constitution, like many legal texts, uses terms that are very open-
textured.66 John Hart Ely identifies the Eighth Amendment67 as appearing 
“insistently to call for a reference to sources beyond the document 
itself,”68 and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments69 as containing 
“provisions that are difficult to read responsibly as anything other than 
quite broad invitations to import into the constitutional decision process 
considerations that will not be found in the language of the 
amendment.”70 Similarly, Jack Balkin observes that “[t]he text of our 
Constitution contains different types of language,” including 
“determinate rules,” “standards,” and “principles.”71 Where the text takes 
the form of determinate rules, an interpreter’s discretion is fixed; but 
where it “uses vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply 
them to our own circumstances in our own time.”72 The Framers used 
standards and principles “to channel politics through certain key 
concepts but delegate the details to future generations”; thus, “fidelity to 
the Constitution” occasionally “requires future generations to engage in 
  
 64. Id. at 129. 
 65. Id. at 130. 
 66. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
13 (1980). 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 68. ELY, supra note 66, at 13. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, XIV. 
 70. ELY, supra note 66, at 13. 
 71. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6 (2011). 
 72. Id. at 7. 
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constitutional construction”73—to look beyond the four corners of the 
document to develop its meaning.  
If some constitutional provisions are so textually indeterminate that 
faithful interpretation will necessarily require recourse to a set of 
external referents, and if generations subsequent to that of the Framers 
are textually tasked with filling out the Constitution’s meaning on their 
own, in light of contemporary conditions, then who says foreign law 
can’t be one source of such meaning? Certainly not the text, which, 
we’ve noted, is silent as to the propriety of invoking foreign law—not 
condoning the practice, but not condemning it either. We regularly use 
dictionaries, law review articles, books, other laws, canons of 
construction, legislative history, common law terms of art, and colloquial 
parlance to construe the text of the Constitution—given this rich 
diversity of sources that we employ, why must foreign law be 
categorically condemned? 
In my view, the best textual argument for the legitimacy of citing 
foreign law in constitutional argument is not based on an inference that is 
explicit in the text, but on one rooted in the open-texture of the document 
as a whole. By failing to specify its own meaning in various places—by 
using vocabulary, grammar, and semantic form that cannot be given 
substance without looking to extra-textual sources of meaning—the 
Constitution’s very text invites us to imbue it with something. Its open 
texture gestures toward referents that lie beyond its borders without 
defining what those referents must be. Nothing in the text excludes 
foreign law from the list of candidates. To the extent that we as a society 
choose to use foreign law as a source of meaning to fill out our 
constitutional intestacies, the indeterminacy of the text permits us to do 
so. 
B. History 
How would we evaluate the legitimacy of citing foreign law as a 
matter of history? While various originalisms differ in their exact 
methodologies, all agree that constitutional questions should be decided 
in accordance with the original meaning of the relevant constitutional 
  
 73. Id. 
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provisions. Originalists such as Justice Scalia74 and Judge Bork75 believe 
that what matters is “original public meaning,” which “can be 
illuminated by legislative history and by contemporary speeches, articles, 
and dictionaries.”76 The interpretive methodology that would have been 
used by legislators and informed members of the public may also be 
relevant to an originalist appraisal.77 For originalists, the legitimacy of a 
constitutional practice stems from its conformity to how the Constitution 
would have been understood at the time of ratification or amendment.  
Some, such as Harold Koh,78 and Justice Ginsburg79 have invoked the 
language of the Declaration of Independence—specifically, its reference 
  
 74. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving 
v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2012) (“Originalists believe that it is the 
original public meaning of the words of a legal text that govern and not the subjective 
spin put on that text by members of Congress in the legislative history. In other words, 
Scalia-style originalists should not concern themselves with original intent.”) (citation 
omitted); William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, 
Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 497–
98 (2007) (showing that Justice Scalia uses debate history and then-contemporary 
political writings in interpreting the Constitution); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting 
the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts] (arguing 
that original meaning should be determined with reference to the understandings of 
intelligent, informed people of the era); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1989) (asserting that the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the Framing Era is dispositive of constitutional meaning). 
 75. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (“If someone found a letter from George Washington to Martha 
telling her that what he meant by the power to lay taxes was not what other people meant, 
that would not change our reading of the Constitution in the slightest. . . . Law is a public 
act. Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how the words 
used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time.”). 
 76. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).  
 77. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: 
A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
751, 763 (2009) (“Although the public meaning cannot be divorced from word meanings 
or grammar rules, Barnett never explains why interpretive rules should be treated 
differently. It is true that the content of these interpretive rules is disputable, but so is the 
content of word meanings and grammatical rules.”). 
 78. Harold Hongju Koh, Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Lecture on Constitutional Law, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2002) (“The question I want to ask is whether we, as 
 
2016] The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law 321 
to “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind”80—to argue that the 
citation of foreign law accords with the intentions of those who wrote 
it.81 But arguments like this, as Jeremy Waldron observes, amount to 
little more than the “mouthing [of] platitudes.”82 The purpose of that 
phrase’s usage in the Declaration was “not to justify the importation of 
foreign precedents but to justify requiring American patriots to explain 
themselves to the world.”83 
Some defend the practice of citing foreign law by observing that the 
Framers in fact relied extensively on sources of foreign law as they 
drafted the Constitution itself. Paul Finkelman notes that delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention “made numerous references to foreign law 
and foreign governmental systems.”84 To give a few examples, the 
English constitution was described as “admirable,”85 and debates over 
executive compensation were punctuated with Benjamin Franklin’s 
references to “the High Sheriff in England and the French ‘office of 
Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments.’”86 James Wilson 
invoked “examples of Turkey, Russia, and Persia to support the idea that 
the states had to continue to exist, even as they had to be subordinate to 
the national government” in objecting to the New Jersey Plan.87 Another 
  
Americans, pay decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our administration of the 
death penalty.”). 
 79. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of 
[Human]Kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 
26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 927, 930 (2011) (“The drafters and signers of the Declaration of 
Independence showed their concern about the opinions of other peoples; they placed 
before the world the reasons why the States, joining together to become the United States 
of America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain.”). 
 80. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 81. See generally Koh, supra note 78; Ginsburg, supra note 79. 
 82. JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN 
LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 22 (2012). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Paul Finkelman, Foreign Law and American Constitutional Interpretation: A 
Long and Venerable Tradition, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 37 (2007). 
 85. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 278 (Max Farrand 
ed., Yale Univ. Press rev. ed., 1966) (1911) [hereinafter 2 Farrand]. 
 86. Finkelman, supra note 84, at 38 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 84 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press rev. ed., 1966) (1911) 
[hereinafter 1 Farrand]). 
 87. Id. at 39 (citing 1 Farrand, supra note 86, at 328). 
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delegate, John Dickinson, relied on Blackstone to understand the phrase 
“ex post facto.”88 Such examples are plentiful.89  
“[I]f Blackstone helped our framers grope their way through difficult 
issues of their time,” Steve Sanders asks, “why should American courts 
today refuse any help from their global peers as they reason their way 
through difficult issues of our time?”90 But arguments like this probably 
would not sway most originalists, who would observe that there is an 
enormous difference between the task of writing a constitution, in which 
drafters are free to rely for inspiration on whatever sources they please, 
and the task of interpreting a constitution,91 in which faithful participants 
should try to discern the meaning of the constitution that its Framers 
actually did create in light of the way it would have been understood at 
the time.92 Justice Scalia himself recognizes that “comparison with the 
practices of other countries is very useful in devising a constitution. But 
why is it useful in interpreting one?”93 As Scalia has said, “in writing [a 
constitution], of course you consult foreign sources, see how it has 
worked, see what they’ve done, use their examples and so forth. But that 
has nothing to do with interpreting it.”94 When drafting a constitution, 
one writes on a clean slate; but by the time one is interpreting a 
constitution, the slate has been written on, and one’s job is to try to the 
best of one’s abilities to read it. 
A better originalist argument for citing foreign law might be that, as 
Steven G. Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl have shown, the 
Supreme Court cited foreign law numerous times during the era 
following the Constitution’s ratification,95 without producing 
  
 88. Id. at 40 (citing 2 Farrand, supra note 85, at 448–49). 
 89. See generally id. at 37–42. 
 90. Steve Sanders, American Legal Conservatives Oppose the Citation of 
Foreign Law, But What About the Hallowed Practice of Citing to Blackstone?, FINDLAW 
(Oct. 10, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ commentary/20081010_sanders.html.  
 91. See, e.g., Dorsen, supra note 57, at 538 (“Alexander Hamilton, sir, was 
writing a Constitution, not interpreting one.”). 
 92. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 74, at 37–38. 
 93. Dorsen, supra note 57, at 525. 
 94. Id. at 538–39. 
 95. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty 
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 791 (2005) (“We thus conclude that in the first 
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contemporaneous backlash to suggest that this practice was considered to 
be inappropriate at the time, one exception.96 Thus, “commentators who 
say that the Court has never before cited or relied upon foreign law are 
clearly and demonstrably wrong.”97 
Many early decisions citing foreign law were written by Chief Justice 
Marshall, Calabresi and Zimdahl observe.98 In Talbot v. Seeman (1801),99 
Marshall wrote that “the laws of the United States ought not, if it be 
avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and 
usages of nations, or the general doctrines of national law.”100 In Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy (1804),101 he asserted that “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”102 In practice, Calabresi and 
Zimdahl note, Marshall was instructing courts to “exercise [their] 
constitutional power [to interpret statutes] by giving legal weight to 
foreign sources of law.”103 In Rose v. Himley (1808),104 Marshall 
examined several English cases decided subsequent to American 
independence,105 concluding that “[t]he manner in which this subject is 
understood . . . . is adopted by this court as the true principle which ought 
  
fifty years of Supreme Court history there were references to foreign sources of law by 
three Justices-Marshall, Story, and Johnson.”). 
 96. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 164–83 (1820) 
(Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 97. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 755. 
 98. Id. at 763. See generally id. at 763–80, for a much more thorough discussion 
of the cases that follow. 
 99. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 
 100. Id. at 43. 
 101. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
 102. Id. at 118. 
 103. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 766. 
 104. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808), overruled by Hudson v. 
Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810). 
 105. Id. at 270–71 (discussing Flad Oyen, (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 124, 1 C. Rob. 
114, 134 (High Ct. Admlty); The Christopher, (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 291, 2 C. Rob. 173, 
209 (High Ct. Admlty); The Henrick and Maria, (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 129, 1 C. Rob. 35, 
146 (High Ct. Admlty); and The Helena, (1801) 165 Eng. Rep. 515, 4 C. Rob. 3 (High 
Ct. Admlty)); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 767–68 (discussing 
Marshall’s treatment of these cases). 
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to govern in this case.”106 Thus, “foreign law [was] adopted by Chief 
Justice Marshall as the new American rule of law.”107 
In Brown v. United States (1814),108 Marshall canvassed the views of 
“famous foreign jurists and writers,”109 and declared that “a construction 
ought not lightly to be admitted which would give to a declaration of war 
an effect in this country it does not possess elsewhere.”110 Justice Joseph 
Story dissented, but he did not object to Marshall’s citation of foreign 
law; his own opinion relied on foreign sources extensively.111 In The 
Antelope (1825),112 Marshall observed that the slave trade, though 
“contrary to the law of nature,”113 had been engaged in by “Christian and 
civilized nations of the world, with whom we have most intercourse,”114 
and that it has been “sanctioned in modern times by the laws of all 
nations who possess distant colonies, each of whom has engaged in it as 
a common commercial business which no other could rightfully 
interrupt.”115 Marshall also noted Britain’s abolition of slavery,116 and 
referred with approval to several British antislavery decisions that had 
been decided after 1776.117 
  
 106. Rose v Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 271 (1808). 
 107. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 769. The authors note that 
“[a]dmittedly, this case is an example of the Supreme Court borrowing a rule in an 
admiralty case from a country closely related to the United States and not one of the 
Court being influenced by the mores of France or Germany.” Id. However, they say, they 
believe the case “is at least a little disturbing for the thesis that the Supreme Court ought 
never to look to foreign sources of law.” Id. 
 108. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
 109. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 770. 
 110. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125. 
 111. Id. at 132–41 (Story, J., dissenting) (surveying the views of various foreign 
jurists). 
 112. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
 113. Id. at 120. 
 114. Id. at 114–15. 
 115. Id. at 115. 
 116. Id. at 115–16. 
 117. See The Amedie, (1810) 12 Eng. Rep. 92 (P.C.) 1 Acton 240; The Diana, 
(1813) 165 Eng. Rep. 1245 (High Ct. Admlty), 1 Dods. 95; and Le Louis, (1817) 165 
Eng. Rep. 1464 (High Ct. Admlty), 2 Dods. 210. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 
116–20 (Chief Justice Marshall discussing several of the British antislavery cases after 
1776). Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 775–77 (discussing Marshall’s treatment 
of the antislavery cases after 1776). 
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In addition to his abovementioned Brown dissent,118 Justice Story also 
authored the majority opinion in United States v. Smith (1820),119 
asserting that the law of nations “may be ascertained by consulting the 
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general 
usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and 
enforcing that law.”120 One footnote cited a variety of “foreign jurists and 
scholars and international practice[s]”121 to prove “that piracy is defined 
by the law of nations.”122 As Calabresi and Zimdahl note, “[t]he Court . . 
. turned to foreign sources of law to uphold the congressional statute that 
otherwise might have been found unconstitutional.”123 In a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Livingston argued both that piracy was insufficiently 
well-defined by the law of nations to justify the imposition of the death 
penalty,124 and that a criminal statute’s meaning must be fixed by 
Congress rather than foreign law.125 Story cited foreign law in one other 
opinion, Columbia Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby (1839),126 in 
which he canvassed Rhodian law127 and the views of foreign jurists.128 
The final opinion of the era to use foreign law was The Rapid (1814);129 
among other things, the Court invoked foreign views in “the most 
enlightened . . . commercial nations.”130 
From an originalist perspective, what does this tell us about the 
legitimacy of using foreign law? One could possibly say ‘nothing’—that 
this is all just post-ratification history, and thus doesn’t speak to the 
  
 118. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 129 (Story, J., dissenting). 
 119. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 157 (1820). 
 120. Id. at 160–61. 
 121. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 783. 
 122. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 163 n.8. 
 123. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95, at 782. 
 124. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“Although it 
cannot be denied that some writers on the law of nations do declare what acts are deemed 
piratical, yet it is certain, that they do not all agree.”). 
 125. Id. at 182 (Congress must “incorporate into their own statutes a definition in 
terms, and not [] refer the citizens of the United States for rules of conduct to the statutes 
or laws of any foreign country, with which it is not to be presumed that they are 
acquainted.”). 
 126. Columbia Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331 (1839). 
 127. Id. at 337–39. 
 128. Id. at 339–42. 
 129. The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155 (1814). 
 130. Id. at 162. 
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understanding of ordinary intelligent and informed people of the framing 
era. But that doesn’t seem right. While these cases were admittedly 
decided after the Constitution had already been put into effect, it is fair to 
infer that they reflect the common attitudes concerning the citation of 
foreign law that prevailed at the time of ratification—after all, Talbot 
was decided a mere twelve years after 1789.131 Surely it would be 
unreasonable to assume that American attitudes toward the use of foreign 
law had shifted so drastically in so short a period of time.  
More likely, these cases illustrate that the Framing generation did not 
regard the citation of foreign law—at least for certain types of usage—as 
negatively as some of the practice’s opponents do today. This conclusion 
is bolstered by the fact that there was seemingly no backlash against the 
Supreme Court’s use of foreign law. Even Livingston’s Smith dissent did 
not purport to condemn the citation of foreign law wholesale—merely 
this particular usage, where he believed that the law of nations did not 
define piracy offenses with sufficient specificity,132 and where criminal 
punishment was at stake.133 It is also bolstered by the fact that several of 
the opinions citing foreign law were written by the legendary Chief 
Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story.134 Within an originalist 
framework, then, the citation of foreign law—for at least some 
purposes—has a fair claim to legitimacy.  
C. Doctrine 
How would a doctrinalist approach the question of whether it is 
legitimate for American courts to invoke foreign law? Professor Bobbitt 
describes doctrinal appeals as consisting of “neutral, general principle[s] 
  
 131. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 
 132. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. (“If in criminal cases every thing is sufficiently certain, which by 
reference may be rendered so, which was an argument used at bar, it is not perceived why 
a reference to the laws of China, or to any other foreign code, would not have answered 
the purpose quite as well as the one which has been resorted to.”). 
 134. Chief Justice Marshall wrote The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); 
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) 241 (1808); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); 
and Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch). Justice Story wrote Columbia Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. 
Ashby, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331 (1839); and Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.). 
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derived from the caselaw construing the Constitution.”135 On one level, 
doctrinalism is all about adherence to precedent. When thought of in this 
sense, the answer seems immediately apparent: of course American 
courts can cite foreign law, because they have done so. Calabresi and 
Zimdahl have demonstrated not only that the Supreme Court cited 
foreign sources of law with some frequency during the early days of the 
Republic, but also that it has continued to do so throughout all 
subsequent epochs of American history.136  
Doctrinalism locates the source of constitutional legitimacy in what 
came before—in what had already been done. Unlike the historical 
modality, in which the older an idea’s roots are the more legitimate it is, 
doctrinalism says that an idea is constitutionally legitimate in proportion 
to how recently it has found expression in the caselaw. The more 
recently a judicial decision has been rendered, the greater authority it 
carries in a subsequent case. This is why today we cite Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954)137 rather than Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),138 or Shelby 
County v. Holder (2013)139 rather than South Carolina v. Katzenbach 
(1966),140 or Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(1985)141 rather than National League of Cities v. Usery (1976).142 Not all 
precedents are created equal; decisions of more recent vintage outweigh 
and/or overrule older ones. This is true even where a newer decision does 
not purport to flatly overrule an older one, but merely modify it. A savvy 
litigator today would sooner cite Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)143 than Roe v. Wade (1973)144 on questions 
concerning abortion—or even better yet, Gonzales v. Carhart (2007).145 
  
 135. BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 17–18. 
 136. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 95. 
 137. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 138. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 139. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 140. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).  
 141. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 142. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).  
 143. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 144. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 145. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, (2007).  
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With respect to the scope of the treaty power,146 meanwhile, she would 
rather cite Bond v. United States (2014)147 than Missouri v. Holland 
(1920).148 
Thus, all that a doctrinalist might need to satisfy herself that the 
citation of foreign law is a legitimate constitutional practice, at least for 
some purposes, is to observe that in recent years, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly cited foreign law. Since 1997, the Court has invoked foreign 
law in Roper v. Simmons (2005),149 Lawrence v. Texas (2003),150 Atkins 
v. Virginia (2002),151 and, in one of the rarer examples of foreign law’s 
invocation to reach a conservative decision, Washington v. Glucksberg 
(1997).152 It is important to note that that these decisions all endorsed the 
citation of foreign law only for a certain purpose, however—as 
persuasive, rather than binding, authority.153 None of the recent cases 
suggest that foreign law qua foreign law is binding on American courts 
or displaces what would otherwise be the appropriate rule of decision.154 
This suggests that there is good doctrinal support only for the legitimacy 
of citing foreign law as persuasive authority. 
  
 146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur . . . .”). 
 147. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 148. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 149. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).  
 150. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 576–77 (2003). 
 151. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002). 
 152. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 717–18 nn.15–16, 730, 732, 743–
53 (1997).  
 153. See case excerpts cited supra notes 149–152. 
 154. For example, Lawrence invoked foreign law to disprove the argument, made 
in Bowers v. Hardwick, that “‘[c]ondemnation of [homosexual] practices is firmly rooted 
in Judeao–Christian moral and ethical standards.’” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–73 quoting 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196, (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
Likewise, Glucksberg invoked the Dutch experience with euthanasia to substantiate 
concerns that the practice may be abused in “cases involving vulnerable persons.” 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734. In both cases, the Court cited foreign law for a limited, 
discrete purpose, not to constitute the basis of its analysis. Likewise, in Roper, the Court 
invoked foreign law to establish the existence of a consensus against the imposition of the 
death penalty for juveniles, but explicitly noted that “[t]he opinion of the world 
community [is] not controlling our outcome,” but merely “provide[s] respected and 
significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” 543 U.S. at 578. 
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But there is also another sense in which doctrinal concerns may bear 
on how we understand the legitimacy of citing foreign law. Doctrinalism 
is about more than just the rote, mechanistic application of good judicial 
precedents; on a deeper level, it is about consistent, principled decision-
making. The essence of doctrinalism lies in “announcing a general 
principle applicable to a larger class,”155 and then applying that principle 
to the facts at hand; what matters are “neutral principles of general 
application.”156 H.L.A. Hart once criticized the collective Supreme Court 
decisions from the prior term on the grounds that they “lack[ed] the 
underpinning of principle which is necessary to . . . exemplify . . . the 
rule of law.”157 According to Bobbitt, “only such opinions will be 
legitimate.”158 
This search for consistent, principled, uniform legal decision-making 
is echoed in Jeremy Waldron’s jurisprudential justification for citing 
foreign law, which rests on notions of “consistency, harmonization, and 
integrity,” of “treating like cases alike.”159 The claim is that we ought to 
cite foreign law in order to harmonize our law with that of other nations 
in order to achieve transnational consistency, because, as Waldron says, 
“[w]e are bound into a global community, especially on questions of 
fundamental rights, and we cannot ignore the concerns about fairness and 
evenhandedness that might arise in the world on that basis.”160 If you 
think that there are certain things that are just plain law across the globe, 
no matter where you are, then citing foreign law to bring American law 
into harmony with the law of other nations has a doctrinal purpose.  
To accept this type of argument, one would have to accept that there 
is “a body of jurisprudence constituted jointly by a consistency among 
decisions in the world that could be held out as a resource.”161 It is on this 
belief that Waldron justifies the citation of foreign law, the belief that 
there are “deep background principles, legal principles, [that] may be 
  
 155. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 46–47. 
 156. Id. at 42. 
 157. Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart 
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959) (lower courts can apply “[o]nly opinions 
which are grounded in reason.”).  
 158. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 714 (1980). 
 159. WALDRON, supra note 82, at 141. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 67. 
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inferred not just from a single existing body of positive law . . . but also 
from multiple legal systems taken together.”162 The idea is not that 
foreign law is binding on us qua foreign law, but rather that the recurring 
presence of certain norms in foreign legal sources indicates, as a clue, 
that a norm just inheres it what it means for something to be law.163 
This is the sort of reasoning that is implicit in the famous New York 
Court of Appeals decision Riggs v. Palmer (1889),164 which Waldron 
discusses in fleshing out his argument.165 A 16-year-old man killed his 
grandfather and then sought to inherit property that was willed to him.166 
Notwithstanding what appeared to be the plain, literal letter of state 
statutes on the subject of wills,167 the court held that the man could not 
inherit.168 Instead, it reasoned that “all laws as well as all contracts may 
be controlled in their operation and effect by general, fundamental 
maxims of the common law.”169 One such maxim was the principle that 
“[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take 
advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own 
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.”170 Significantly, the 
court asserted that “[t]hese maxims . . . have their foundation in universal 
law administered in all civilized countries.”171 It then cited the Code 
Napoléon,172 the Civil Code of Lower Canada,173 and Roman law174 in 
support of the general legal proposition—that no one may profit by his 
crime—that it had just recognized.  
  
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. See id. (“Indeed, principles whose presence may not be so apparent in one 
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systems.”). 
 164. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).  
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2016] The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law 331 
The New York Court of Appeals wasn’t using foreign law to displace 
New York law; it was saying that certain universal principles were 
already part of state law by virtue of their global ubiquity, and used 
foreign law merely to illustrate or illuminate these principles.175 If one 
accepts that we are a “participant[] in a common judicial enterprise . . . 
[part of] a community with identifiable organizing principles,”176 then 
citing foreign law in this sort of way is legitimated by doctrinal need for 
legal consistency at a global scale. “[J]ust as fire burns in Persia as well 
as in Greece, so murder is wrong in Carthage and in Rome.”177 
On the other hand, this global-doctrinalism can run the other way as 
well—counseling against the use of foreign law—in at least two 
important ways. The first is that inviting American courts to invoke 
foreign law as they please without also instructing them to articulate 
some “jurisprudence which explains what they are doing in this 
regard”178—to adhere to some sort of “theory of law” that will “explain 
why American courts are legally permitted or obligated to invoke non-
American sources and how that practice connects with the status of 
courts as legal institutions”179—would make “inconsistent and 
unprincipled citation” virtually “inevitable.”180 In part, this would result 
simply from the fact that it would be very difficult to articulate any 
principled set or rules or standards to govern the citation of foreign law 
that could account for the innumerable differences between and 
variations among all of the world’s judiciaries. As Judge Richard Posner 
notes, “[t]he judicial systems of the United States are relatively uniform, 
and their product readily accessible, while the judicial systems of the rest 
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of the world are immensely varied and most of their decisions 
inaccessible, as a practical matter, to our monolingual judges and law 
clerks.”181 American courts are also ill-equipped to understand, much less 
account for, the “complex socio-historico-politico-institutional 
background[s]” from which foreign decisions emerge, of which, Posner 
asserts, “our judges . . . are almost entirely ignorant.”182 Justice Scalia 
also expresses this concern, saying that “[o]ne of the difficulties of using 
foreign law is that you don’t understand what the surrounding 
jurisprudence is.”183 
This, in turn, would give rise to another problem: namely, a 
proliferation of opportunities for cynical, opportunistic, unprincipled 
citation. “If foreign decisions were freely citable,” Posner says, “it would 
mean that any judge wanting a supporting citation had only to troll 
deeply enough in the world’s corpus juris to find it.”184 Justice Scalia 
gives voice to this concern in his Roper dissent185—the fear that 
American judges will selectively invoke foreign law to mask their own 
policy preferences. “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own 
thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking,” 
Scalia thunders, “but sophistry.”186 Later, Scalia says: “What these 
foreign sources ‘affirm,’ . . . is the Justices’ own notion of how the world 
ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in America.”187 
He has a point. As Scalia has said, citation of foreign law in this manner 
“lends itself to manipulation. It invites manipulation.”188 Using foreign 
law without some organized body of standards to guide you is “akin to 
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2016] The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law 333 
‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”189 Judge Frank 
Easterbrook just assumes that this is what the Court was doing in several 
recent cases in which it cited foreign law, declaring himself “inclined to 
think that these references are just window dressing.”190  
Of course, the proper response might be that judges already have a 
more than sufficient arsenal of tools to codify their personal ideological, 
prudential or aesthetic preferences into law, and so preventing them from 
using foreign law won’t change a thing. As Judge Michael Kirby of the 
High Court of Australia said, “if you’re just going to pick out the ideas 
and reasoning that you like, if you’re going to shove them in your 
opinions, and give what you wrote decoration, well, that’s dishonest.”191 
So what? “If judges want to be dishonest, then they’ll be dishonest.”192 
This suggests that judges should not use foreign law without having first 
articulated a theory about why and when it is permissible to invoke it, 
lest they be tempted to cite it in an unprincipled way. 
The second way to object to the use of foreign law on global-doctrinal 
grounds is to reject the premise that we have any need to unify our law 
with that of other countries outright. If one does not believe that we are 
“bound into a global community,”193 then there is simply very little need 
for any legal uniformity between nations. What happens here is not the 
same as what happens there, for many reasons, and therefore there is no 
doctrinal need to reconcile the two. Or as Justice Scalia says, “we don’t 
have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and 
never have.”194 Therefore, “it is quite impossible for French practice to 
be useful in determining the evolving standards of decency of American 
society.”195 Put more bluntly: “[W]hat does the opinion of a wise 
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Zimbabwe judge or a wise member of a House of Lords law 
committee—what does that have to do with what Americans believe?”196 
In sum, the citation of foreign law as persuasive authority is certainly 
legitimate to the extent that legitimacy is derived from adherence to 
fairly recent judicial precedents, although there is little basis to claim that 
it would be likewise legitimate to cite foreign law as binding authority. 
On a more global scale, the practice is either legitimate or illegitimate 
based on whether you perceive a need to integrate American law into a 
larger body of transnational law. I imagine that most Americans would 
emphatically disagree that such a need exists. But again, this only means 
that we need to reject foreign law as a source of binding authority—it 
does not mean we cannot cite it for persuasive purposes. 
D. Prudence 
The prudential argument for the legitimacy of citing foreign law 
seems straightforward at first, but as we will see, there are compelling 
prudential arguments against the practice that its supporters might not 
recognize at first. Prudential argument can be thought of as being 
concerned with the best way to vindicate constitutional values in the real 
world. Prudential appeals, Bobbitt says, “are efforts to bring to 
constitutional decisionmaking ‘the impact of actuality.’”197  
The straightforward argument for citing foreign law a prudentialist 
might offer is that foreign decisions may contain truths, knowledge or 
information about facts of the world that are relevant to an American 
judge. To decide any case, a judge needs to know certain things about the 
world; statutes and case law cannot be used to resolve legal disputes 
unless on their own, they must be applied to the facts at hand. This is so 
obvious that it almost seems silly to say so. Sometimes these are 
empirical facts—where was the person at the relevant time, who owned 
the thing, what is the thing, etc.  
Sometimes, these are facts about what sort of consequences follow 
from the establishment of certain legal regimes, or from the application 
of certain legal rules. This was the sense in which Chief Justice 
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Rehnquist cited foreign law in Glucksberg,198 acknowledging the 
troublesome consequences that might accompany legalized euthanasia by 
invoking the Netherland’s experience. Think too of Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in Printz v. United States (1997),199 which observed that 
Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands all task constituent states 
with implementing federal programs,200 on the belief that “such a system 
interferes less, not more, with the independent authority of the ‘state,’ 
member nation, or other subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard 
individual liberty as well.”201 He uses these European experiences to 
conclude that “there is no need to interpret the Constitution as containing 
an absolute principle”202—here, a prohibition on federal commandeering 
of state executive officials.203 
Indeed, one line from Breyer’s opinion encapsulates the prudential 
argument for citing foreign law as well as anybody could: while 
acknowledging that “there may be relevant political and structural 
differences between their systems and our own,” he nonetheless asserts 
that “their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.”204 
Breyer, who has elsewhere defended the practice of citing foreign law, 
has expressed the following belief, 
[foreign] cases sometimes involve a human being working as a judge 
concerned with a legal problem, often similar to problems that arise 
here, which problem involves the application of a legal text, often 
similar to the text of our own Constitution, seeking to protect certain 
basic human rights, often similar to the rights that our own Constitution 
seeks to protect.205 
Breyer asks, “[i]f I have a difficult case and a human being called a 
judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar 
problem, why should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind 
  
 198. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734–35 (1997). 
 199. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 200. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 976–77. 
 202. Id. at 977. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Dorsen, supra note 57, at 523. 
336 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2  
me, but I may learn something.”206 This is the prudential argument for the 
legitimacy of citing foreign law in a nutshell. 
Finally, the facts with which a judge may want to be acquainted may 
be distinctly moral sorts of facts. In Lawrence, the Court cited foreign 
law to show that disapproval of homosexuality is not a value universally 
adopted in “wider civilization”207 and that the right being asserted “has 
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries.”208 Roper likewise cited foreign law to demonstrate the 
existence of a virtually universal global repulsion toward executing 
children.209 This case offers an especially-apt example of the prudential 
citation of foreign law to purportedly illustrate, rather than create, a value 
internal to the U.S. Constitution; the Court expressly claims that “the 
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and 
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our 
own heritage of freedom.”210 Atkins similarly invoked foreign legal 
materials to illustrate “a much broader social . . . consensus”211 regarding 
the execution of the mentally-ill. It highlighted a brief submitted on 
behalf of the European Union to demonstrate “overwhelming 
disapprov[al]” of the practice “within the world community.”212 Thus, 
although Joan Larsen was speaking disparagingly when she referred to 
the Court’s citation of foreign law as equivalent to “moral fact-
finding,”213 she was in fact on to something. 
If you are not satisfied with this information-acquisition argument for 
citing foreign law, a more sophisticated prudential account of the 
practice is also available. F.A. Hayek has argued that “[s]pontaneous 
systems of order are able to absorb and to utilize large quantities of 
dispersed knowledge to reach better outcomes than any planner could 
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preordain and design.”214 Says Hayek: “[O]ne of the ways in which 
civilization helps us to overcome th[e] limitation on the extent of 
individual knowledge is by conquering ignorance, not by the acquisition 
of more knowledge, but by the utilization of knowledge which is and 
remains widely dispersed among individuals.”215 If this is true, then a 
legal system that looks to foreign sources of law “may thus be smart in 
the way that free markets are smart.”216 Just as markets “enable[] each 
individual to gain from the skill and knowledge of others whom he need 
not even know and whose aims could be wholly different from his 
own”217 citing foreign law, by “borrowing or perusing the works of other 
competent courts[,] . . . allows a court to outsource the intellectual labor 
necessary to reach a fuller understanding of the issue then before it.”218 
Citing foreign law is symptomatic of “a spontaneous system of 
order,”219 growing “independently in different courts in sovereign nation 
states all over the world, unguided by any global sovereign or supreme 
court proclaiming it.”220 It “constantly adapts itself, and functions 
through adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety are not 
known to anybody.”221 In this way, “it may be information and 
knowledge superior in the way that a market is superior to a Soviet-style 
planned economy.”222 
Of course, one simplistic prudential basis for objecting to the citation 
of foreign law might be that you think cases like Roper,223 Lawrence,224 
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Atkins,225 and/or Glucksberg226 were decided wrongly, and you therefore 
reject the practice on the grounds that it leads to bad outcomes. A more 
sophisticated version of this critique would be that the information that 
domestic courts get from foreign law is bad information, or else is 
categorically inapplicable to American jurisprudence. This is what 
Justice Scalia is getting at when he asks “[o]f what conceivable value as 
indicative of American standards of decency would foreign law be?”227 
He believes that the only way in which foreign law can give judges 
useful information is if they believe that what they are looking for is “the 
best answer to this social question in my judgment as an intelligent 
person,”228 an approach he rejects.229 
Another prudential argument against citing foreign law is that the 
practice encourages judges to invalidate laws whose fate ought to be 
decided through political, not judicial, processes. Prudentialists recognize 
that “a court’s first responsibility is to decide whether it should 
decide,”230 and believe that it “should avoid constitutional decision in 
order to safeguard [its] own position and to activate the political 
processes of the legislature.”231 Justice Brandeis once said that “[t]he 
most important thing we do is not doing.”232 According to Bobbitt, a 
prudentialist would believe that “by prudently avoiding some 
controversies and by handling others in subtle, indirect ways the Court 
could preserve its independence and authority for those few cases that 
should be decided on the merits.”233 When it comes to deciding 
politically-charged controversies, prudentialists believe that less is often 
more. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook eloquently articulates the prudential 
objection to citing foreign law. He says that the problem with the 
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Supreme Court’s citation of foreign law isn’t that the Justices are 
undermining American sovereignty, but that they “have taken a kingly 
role for themselves.”234 Too often, he says, judges “start with the belief 
that the judiciary will flesh out vague rules.”235 They assume that “(a) 
there is no answer to be found in the Constitution’s own text and history, 
but (b) the judiciary must give an answer. When those conditions hold, 
people search far and wide.”236 But when there is no answer to be found 
in constitutional text and history, strict constructionists might argue, the 
judiciary not only needn’t give an answer, but mustn’t.237 Says 
Easterbrook: “the Constitution is higher law and constrains the 
democratic process. But the emphasis in this phrase must be on the word 
‘law,’ not on the word ‘constrains.’”238 
Easterbrook’s main problem with citing foreign law is that it is a 
manifestation of expression of the Court’s over-willingness to resolve 
disputes that ought not be settled judicially.239 Foreign law may not be 
the cause of this problem, but it is another tool to which they have 
recourse when meddling in issues they have no business entertaining. As 
Easterbrook puts it: 
  Judges who deny that fundamental nature of our political system 
may be inclined to cite foreign authorities, but that is the least of their 
sins. The disease lies in the claim of power; foreign citations are just a 
symptom. . . . My objection is not to the sources the judge chooses to 
cite but to the legal perspective that makes them pertinent.240 
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E. Structure 
It is much more difficult to legitimate the practice of citing foreign 
law on structural grounds than on textual, historical, doctrinal, or 
prudential grounds. One might be tempted to finger Breyer’s Printz 
dissent as an example of using foreign law within the structuralist 
modality.241 Breyer contrasted the federal system of the United States 
with those of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, asserting 
that “[a]t least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have 
found that local control is better maintained through application of a 
principle that is the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives 
from the silence of our Constitution.”242 Breyer’s move here can be 
described as using foreign law in a way that bears on constitutional 
structure. 
But this thinking confuses the usefulness of citing foreign law with its 
legitimacy. It may well be the case that foreign legal materials can be 
useful tools for doing structural analysis, but that is not the question; it is 
whether the practice of citing foreign law is legitimate as a structural 
matter. Just as the citation of foreign law may not lend itself to a 
particular modal use but still be legitimate within that modal form, so 
may it be lend itself to a modal use but not be legitimate as a matter of 
that modality. 
In a way, the technique of structural argument—the logical inferences 
that pulse through it, the grammar it employs—is even more deeply 
internal to a particular constitution than even arguments from the text 
itself. Language is inherently contextual, because words lack objective 
significance that exists independently of how they are used in relation to 
other words, and to the referents that speakers and listeners use to 
interpret them.243 To understand the meaning that the words in a snippet 
of text convey, one must first understand some referent or set of referents 
that are external to the text; it is only that referent or set of referents that 
gives content to the words. 
In contrast, structural appeals do not seem to depend on external 
referents in the way that textual appeals do. While texts must necessarily 
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be given content by sources of meaning that are external to them, 
structural argument is about drawing inferences from other parts of the 
Constitution itself. Textualists use dictionaries, canons of construction, 
legislative history, and so on to elucidate constitutional meaning, but 
structuralists derive constitutional truths solely from the various interior 
structures and relationships that the Constitution establishes. Because the 
set of referents that structuralists use to understand the Constitution is 
internal to the Constitution, there is less if any room for reliance on or 
utilization of external referents such as foreign law. In this way, 
structuralism is a closed universe; it is more self-contained than 
textualism is. At the very least, it does not seem to invite importation of 
external sources of meaning in the way that textualism does. 
And in fact, there are a number of structural arguments that can be 
made against the citation of foreign law. Bobbitt refers to “the 
electorate’s assigned central role in the federal government” as one of the 
“structural facts from the relationships among which one may infer 
certain constitutional rules.”244 Another such structural fact is the 
“structure of citizenship.”245 Chief Justice Warren wrote that “[t]his 
Government was born of its citizens, it maintains itself in a continuing 
relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is without power to sever 
the relationship that gives rise to its existence.”246 Bobbitt understands 
Warren’s assertion to “stand for the proposition that because the 
relationship between citizen and government is a fundamental structural 
relationship, it cannot be altered in any substantial way whatsoever 
except by the constitutionally established means of changing the 
structure itself by amendment.”247 Essential to the structure of citizenship 
is thus the “axiomatic[]” notion “that government does not have the 
power to unilaterally dissolve the bonds of citizenship.”248 
What does this have to do with the citation of foreign law? Well, just 
as “Article I provides the link between government operations and the 
democratic mandate by requiring that all funding take place by statutes, 
that is, by the actions of persons who can be turned out by the voters 
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every biennium,”249 so can it be argued that Article III—which vests the 
federal judiciary with jurisdiction over all cases “arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority”250—creates a link between judicial 
operations and the democratic mandate by requiring that all “Cases”251 be 
decided on the basis of rules by which the people, acting through 
democratic channels, chose to be governed. When courts rely on foreign 
law, which the people had no hand in crafting, they weaken if not break 
this democratic link. This isn’t a jingoistic or nationalistic argument, it is 
a structural one. 
Just as “the system of representative government would be 
circumvented” were it that “government operations could be funded 
without statutory action,”252 so would it be arguably undermined if courts 
could apply laws that had not been approved by the American people as 
rules of decision in cases before them. With respect to government 
funding, Bobbitt says that “the Constitution provides a crucial link 
between the citizens of the democracy and the actions of the government 
in a way that is calculated to engage the attention of a busy and 
preoccupied people[:] . . . oversight of how their money is being 
spent.”253 Well, oversight of the legal rules in the balance of which hang 
one’s “life, liberty, or property”254 also seems like a link calculated to 
grab the people’s attention—you’ll pay closer attention to the behavior of 
your lawmakers if their actions determine whether or not you get to keep 
your property, go to jail, or even live. To the extent that the citation of 
foreign law undermines this link, it is structurally illegitimate. 
In the “American system . . . the people and not the state are 
sovereign.”255 We hold elections, and they are “messy and tedious,”256 
but the winners get to govern for two years, four, or six years. Though 
the victors “are not bound by their campaign promises . . . they will have 
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to defend their actions at the next election.”257 But what if “the 
discussions of an important issue, pro and con, were simply a sham[?]”258 
What if “some position unknown to the candidates and to the public was 
the real policy being pursued by the government[?]”259 Well, as Bobbitt 
says, “[t]he entire system is thus subverted. Elections and public 
discourse would be simply irrelevant, although only a few would know 
this.”260 Something like this can be said to happen whenever a court cites 
foreign law. When courts invoke foreign law, they are invoking law that 
the American people did not democratically choose for themselves. The 
democratic political process is less relevant to the degree that courts 
won’t rely exclusively on the laws that it produces anyway. What is the 
point of even writing your own constitution if your courts are just going 
to end up using someone else’s in the end anyway? 
Another structural inference can be drawn from the language of the 
Tenth Amendment, which reads: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”261 From this 
language a rough diagram of constitutional decision-makers can be 
sketched: the people delegate some finite amount of their powers to the 
federal government, then delegate some finite amount of the remainder 
to the states, then keep the rest for themselves. The federal government, 
the states, and the people; these are the actors who exercise constitutional 
judgment. Under our constitutional structure, foreign law simply forms 
no part of our legal system. Foreign actors are not to exercise 
constitutional decision-making power on our behalf. 
A final structural inference can be drawn from the existence of the 
treaty-making power262 and the power “[t]o define and punish piracies 
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of 
nations.”263 The Treaty, Piracy, and Law of Nations Clauses can be said 
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 261. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 262. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The president “shall have power, by and with the advice 
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to illustrate the only constitutionally-established relationship that exists 
between the American people and foreign or international sources of 
law—a consensual relationship, in which the people democratically 
choose whether and the extent to which we wish to be governed by 
foreign law. Then consensual element is lacking, to some degree, when 
life-tenured judges impose rules on us that rely on foreign law. The 
Constitution seemingly contemplates that foreign law is only binding on 
us when we have chosen to be so bound. We don’t consent to foreign 
law. 
On a deep level, these structural arguments against the legitimacy of 
citing foreign law make intuitive sense; this is what people mean when 
they say that foreign law is not our law, or that it is not a part of our law. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that this type of argument only 
counsels against a particular way of citing foreign law; namely, using it 
as if it were our own law. But again, this is the great straw man—
virtually no one actually thinks courts ought to apply foreign law as the 
rule of decision in a case and displace existing American law. The 
argument is usually much more modest: that foreign law can sometimes 
be helpful for understanding and interpreting what is, fundamentally, 
American law. Structural argument may simply have nothing to say 
about this sort of invocation of American law. At the very least, the 
structural logic that counsels against citing foreign law is substantially 
weakened when foreign law is being invoked in a persuasive, rather than 
binding, fashion. Structuralism doesn’t seem to compel this usage of 
foreign law, but nor does it seem to prohibit it. 
Finally, while there may not be a strong structural argument in favor 
of citing foreign law, there is a clear separation of powers argument 
against allowing Congress to forbid the courts from using it. “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is,”264 and Congress has no business telling the judicial 
department how to go about doing its job. Thus, one may conclude, as a 
structural matter that courts shouldn’t use foreign law, but also that if 
they do, Congress shouldn’t do anything about it, like the political 
question doctrine in reverse.265 
  
 264. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803). 
 265. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 
1 (1849). 
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F. Ethos 
How would one attempt to legitimate or illegitimate the citation of 
foreign law using appeals to constitutional ethos? Bobbitt argues that 
ethical argument proceeds first by suggesting an implied limitation on 
the means by which the federal government may pursue legitimate ends, 
ends whose achievement are permissible official purposes.266  
If the law or official action being challenged on ethical grounds is a 
state law or an action done by a state (as opposed to federal) actor, an 
additional step is necessary. Unlike the federal government, the states 
“are not creatures of limited, delegated purposes.”267 The enumerated list 
of Article I, section 8 congressional powers268 is a list of the purposes 
with respect to which Congress may act to the policy domains in which 
Congress may act, not a list of tools by which Congress is empowered to 
achieve these ends. Chief Justice Marshall’s famous line in McCullough 
v. Maryland (1819) is apt here: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”269 Marshall is 
asserting that so long as Congress is empowered to achieve a certain type 
of result, it may use all of the means—all the policy tools—which fairly 
achieve that result, so long as those means are not themselves 
constitutionally forbidden.  
Bobbitt says that when an action by a state is being challenged on 
ethical grounds, we say “as a general matter that those means denied [to] 
the federal government are also limitations of the states, by virtue of the 
integration of federal constitutional norms into the contours of state 
authority produced by the Civil War.” 270 States can do things that the 
  
 266. See BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 150 (“What is needed . . . is the same reasoning 
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 267. Id. (emphasis added). 
 268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 269. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
 270. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 150. As Bobbitt notes, it would be incorrect to say 
that this result was achieved via the vehicles of Reconstruction Amendments rather than 
via the war itself, id. at 151. The Civil War, Bobbitt says, was “a constitutional war,” Id., 
 
346 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2  
federal government cannot do, but if the use of a particular means is 
forbidden to the federal government even in pursuit of an end that it may 
otherwise validly pursue, Bobbitt says, so is it forbidden to the states in 
pursuit of ends that they are otherwise constitutionally-entitled to 
pursue.271 
Because ethical argument is so often directed against actions of the 
state and federal legislatures and executives, we may at first think that 
ethical argument simply has nothing to say about the propriety of citing 
foreign sources of law. But I think that this is incorrect. The outline of 
the ethical argument against the citation of foreign law is at least a little 
different from those of ‘typical’ ethical arguments, which tend to involve 
claims that the American people have impliedly withheld from a federal 
or state executive or legislative entity the power to use certain means for 
pursuing legitimate ends. In contrast, the ethical argument against citing 
foreign law is that the people have impliedly withheld from our 
judiciaries (certainly the federal judiciary and, via the transformation of 
the nature of state authority worked by the Civil War, state judiciaries as 
well) the means of citing foreign law even in pursuit of the end of 
resolving cases or controversies. 
All power exercised by the government is derived from the American 
people.272 Obviously, this applies not only to the “legislative powers 
herein granted”273 and the “executive power,”274 but to the “judicial 
power”275 as well. Now, suppose one were to argue that it were highly 
improper for courts to cite foreign law because one believes, for 
whatever reason, that doing so just cuts deeply against the American 
ethos—that it just is not who we are to do this—if one believes this, then 
  
these amendments, being “mere reflections of the constitutional change which generated 
them.” Id.  
 271. See id. at 152 (“[T]he application of the ethic of limited constitutional 
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there is a plausible ethical claim that we have, in fact, impliedly deprived 
our judiciaries of ability to cite foreign law. 
I would articulate the ethical objection to foreign law as follows: the 
American people may not be governed by laws over which they have no 
part in making. Such laws are foreign to our sensibilities and lack the 
democratic imprimatur we demand of the rules that bind us. Following 
Bobbitt’s example, the ethical argument may be stated in this way: 1.) 
the judiciary is not explicitly empowered to impose foreign sensibilities 
on Americans; 2.) the citation of foreign law is not a necessary or proper 
means to carry out the legitimate judicial function of resolving cases and 
controversies; 3.) the decision to adhere or not adhere to foreign cultural 
norms is reserved to the individual; 4.) the citation of foreign law outside 
of a context where the people have expressly or constructively approved 
of it amounts to the imposition of foreign sensibilities on them and 
eliminates, or at least diminishes, their ability to be governed exclusively 
by sensibilities of their own choosing. 
Phrasing the ethical objection at this level of generality clarifies why 
most Americans wouldn’t react with such hostility to a state court’s 
citation of the law of sister-states.276 Such law may not be of ‘our’ 
making when ‘we’ are defined by reference to our states, but it is still 
‘ours’ in some sense as Americans who share a common identity and 
legal heritage. It also clarifies why Americans wouldn’t much object to a 
statute authorizing (or even requiring) courts to cite foreign law, nor to 
the use of foreign law in interpreting treaties. Neither of these examples 
involve the non-consensual imposition of foreign law on us—in both 
cases, we have in some way acquiesced to it. 
To make sense of this argument, one would need to conceive of the 
citation of foreign law as a means to something, of which courts make 
usage in order to achieve the ends of deciding a case or controversy. Of 
course, the very means-ends distinction itself is “notoriously unreliable 
and [has] caused constitutional trouble in the past.”277 One may disagree 
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that this is the proper way to conceive of the citation of foreign law; one 
may say that citing foreign law isn’t a matter of means or ends but of 
reasons; that it is about the reasons for which a court will employ the 
ordinary means of the judicial power, such as awarding damages, 
injunctions, and so on. Such means are totally with a court’s power; the 
use of foreign law, one can say, is merely about the reasons a court will 
choose to use those means. 
Damages and injunctions are absolutely some of the means by which 
court’s exercise the judicial power—specifically, they are the means by 
which courts carry out their judgments. Enforcing judgments is a core 
component of the judicial power. But as a logical matter, judicial power 
must include the power to simply resolve cases or controversies in the 
first place. Courts have a power to reach judgments that is antecedent to 
its power to enforce judgments. The resolution of a case or controversy is 
an end in pursuit of whose achievement courts can be said to employ 
various means. Indeed, in Marbury v. Madison (1803), Chief Justice 
Marshall suggested that the very institution of judicial review is to be 
understood as merely a means by which a court achieves the end of 
deciding which litigant will prevail.278 In achieving the ends of deciding a 
case or controversy, courts employ various means. Many of these are 
things that are simply too obvious to even occur to us as ‘means’ at all, 
things like reading parties’ briefs, conducting independent research, 
reading amicus briefs, reading treatises, and so on. There is at least a 
colorable claim that the use of foreign legal sources is a ‘means’ to a 
judicial end in this sense. 
  
Legislative congressional discretion begins with the choice of means and 
ends with the adoption of methods and details to carry the delegated 
powers into effect. The distinction between these two things—power and 
discretion—is not only very plain but very important. For while the 
powers are rigidly limited to the enumerations of the Constitution, the 
means which may be employed to carry the powers into effect are not 
restricted, save that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the end, 
and not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution. 
Id. at 291. 
 278. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.”). 
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The nonconsensual nature of the use of foreign law is key to the 
ethical objection. Many opponents of the citation of foreign law in other 
contexts nonetheless recognize the propriety of the practice with respect 
to the interpretation of treaties.279 Justice Scalia has said that “[w]e can, 
and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret 
treaty provisions. Foreign constructions are evidence of the original 
shared understanding of the contracting parties. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their respective courts 
strive to interpret the treaty consistently.”280 In other words, treaties are 
like contracts between two or more sovereigns, and contracts should be 
construed to vindicate the intentions of contracting parties. 
I would argue that the reason that treaties are different is because 
there is a consensual element to the use of foreign law to interpret 
treaties that is absent when foreign law is invoked in other contexts. 
When the American people, via their elected leaders, ratify a treaty, they 
do so subject to the understanding that foreign law may be used to 
interpret the treaty according to the intent of its signers. We can forbid, 
by statute, courts from doing this, or, even more crucially, we can just 
not ratify the treaty altogether. The consensual element that is present in 
this context makes the citation of foreign law less offensive to our 
constitutional ethos than it would otherwise be.  
  
 279. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 2, at 237 (“With the exception of cases that 
raise questions of international law because they involve treaty obligations or facts that 
otherwise implicate international law issues or non-American interests in some form, . . . 
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Scalia has elsewhere said: 
I will use it in the interpretation of a treaty. In fact, in a recent case I 
dissented from the Court, including most of my brethren who like to use 
foreign law, because this treaty had been interpreted a certain way by 
several foreign courts of countries that were signatories, and that way was 
reasonable—although not necessarily the interpretation I would have 
taken as an original matter. But I thought that the object of a treaty being 
to come up with a text that is the same for all the countries, we should 
defer to the views of other signatories, much as we defer to the views of 
agencies—that is to say defer if it’s within the ballpark, if it’s a 
reasonable interpretation, though not necessarily the very best. 
Dorsen, supra note 57, at 521. 
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This is not the same as arguing that with respect to treaty-
interpretation, Americans have waived their rights; as Bobbitt says, you 
can’t invoke the notion of waiver in talking about ethical rights.281 
Rather, this consent is what differentiates the invocation of foreign law 
for the purpose of interpreting treaties to its invocation for other purposes 
as a matter of our constitutional ethos. We can simultaneously have 
ethical objections to the nonconsensual imposition of foreign law on the 
American people in cases like Roper,282 but not object when it is used in 
a way to which we have implicitly or constructively agreed. Therefore, 
we can have impliedly withheld from our judiciaries only the power to 
engage in the former task, because they are different tasks. 
But the $64,000 question remains: are we the sort of people who find 
the notion of judges citing foreign law to be intolerable, such that we 
have impliedly denied our judiciaries the ability to do so? One could 
argue that the notion of self-determination and the imperative that we 
have a hand in the law that is to bind us are so central to the American 
ethos that it is unthinkable that we would willingly vest judges with the 
power to rely on foreign law in rendering decisions to the cases or 
controversies before them. Surely, this cannot be part of the “judicial 
power.”283 We are a people who rebelled against Britain and fought a war 
for our independence, who never joined any European Union-style 
leagues. One does get the sense that those who vigorously oppose the 
citation of foreign law often do so from what seems to be an ethical 
place. They really believe, on a fundamental level, that this practice is 
inconsistent with who we are as a people.  
Consider the tenor of Gary Bauer’s denunciation: “America is a 
unique nation, with a unique Constitution that has its own history,” he 
says.284 “How can we interpret it based on the standards and values of 
judges in Zimbabwe?”285 Invoking the Americans who “spilled their 
blood . . . to sever ties with England forever” during the Revolutionary 
  
 281. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 146 (“If a right is that which is beyond 
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2016] The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law 351 
War, Congressman Ted Poe bemoans that “[n]ow, justices in this land of 
America . . . use British court decisions . . . in interpreting our 
Constitution. What the British could not accomplish by force, our 
Supreme Court has surrendered to them voluntarily.”286 There is more 
than historical appeal going on here; there is a distinctly ethical cast to 
Bauer and Poe’s statements, a sense that the citation of foreign law is not 
just unfaithful to the intentions or understanding of early Americans, but 
that it is in fact deeply un-American. Bauer and Poe really just don’t feel, 
on a very fundamental level, that it is consistent with who ‘we’ are; their 
hostility is rooted in the American ethos. 
In contrast to the structural argument against the citation of foreign 
law, there is something that may be labeled nationalistic or jingoistic 
about the ethical argument against foreign law, although I do not mean 
this in a pejorative sense. “The votes of foreign electorates are not events 
in our democracy,” asserts Judge Richard Posner.287 “I think most 
Americans would think it outrageous that Zimbabwean judges, however 
distinguished they may be, were making law for us.”288 Justice Scalia 
insists that “we don’t have the same moral and legal framework as the 
rest of the world, and never have.”289 Judges who believe in keeping the 
Constitution “up to date,” he says, at least ought to “keep [it] up to date 
with the views of the American people. . . . I’m sure that intelligent men 
and women abroad can make very intelligent arguments, but that’s not 
the issue, because it should not be up to me to make those moral 
determinations.”290 
But a 2006 article by Professor Calabresi makes the most studied and 
reasoned expression of this ethical sentiment.291 Americans, Professor 
Calabresi argues, are “an exceptional people and [have] an exceptional 
role to play in the world.”292 Our uniqueness is an important part of our 
identity, he says: “Americans are more individualistic, more religious, 
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more patriotic, more egalitarian, and more hostile to unions and Marxism 
than are the people of any other advanced democracy.”293 Thus, he 
believes, hostility to foreign law is not just part of our history, but part of 
our character: “American popular culture overwhelmingly rejects the 
idea that the United States has a lot to learn from foreign legal systems, 
including even those of countries to which we are closely related like the 
United Kingdom and Canada.”294 Professor Calabresi’s denunciation is 
rooted in a vision of the American ethos; he argues that citing foreign 
law runs contrary to the kind of people we are. “Most Americans think,” 
he says, “that the United States is an exceptional country that differs 
sharply from the rest of the world and that must therefore have its own 
laws and Constitution.”295 It would be difficult to more thoroughly or 
cogently encapsulate the ethical objection to citing foreign law. 
I suspect that the ethical objection to citing foreign law comes closest 
to reflecting the true psychological basis of opposition to the practice felt 
by many, if not most, of its foes. Bobbitt notes that judges sometimes 
gravitate to particular doctrinal arguments in cases where they may not 
be fully satisfying “because they are being pulled by the 
unacknowledged force of constitutional, ethical argument.”296 Sometimes 
when a court says one thing, “ethical arguments may actually be what is 
motivating the decision process.”297 Unsurprisingly, when other 
modalities “constructed as [] pretext[s]”298 to cloak ethical argument in 
action, this unconscious, unintended subterfuge can result in rather 
“unconvincing rationales.”299 In contrast, when foes of citing foreign law 
express their opposition in nakedly ethical terms, I believe they are being 
very candid about the true underlying bases for their conclusions. They 
are not using ethical appeal to cloak some other grounds for opposing the 
citation of foreign law; their disapproval is rooted in a genuine ethical 
intuition that invoking foreign law in non-consensual ways is 
inconsistent with the American character.  
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Perhaps the ethical legitimacy of citing foreign law is so difficult to 
assess because it is so subjective; either you truly believe that the 
practice is contrary to who we are as a people, to our American values 
and identity, or else you simply don’t. One can, of course, easily deny 
that the American people do have such a deeply-felt objection to the 
citation of foreign law that we have impliedly withheld from our 
judiciaries the ability to invoke it where we have not given our express or 
constructive permission to do so. I would say, however, that within the 
ethical modality, there is at least a colorable argument that citing foreign 
law is illegitimate unless, as in the treaty-interpretation context, the 
American people have first given their (perhaps implied) consent. 
CONCLUSION 
So what, if anything, do we now know about the legitimacy of 
comparative constitutional law? Various arguments for and against the 
practice can be made, I believe, within each of the six modalities, though 
admittedly I find it easier to marshal arguments for it within certain 
modalities, like history and doctrine, and more difficult within others, 
like structure and ethos. Text and prudence, I believe, are fairly 
indeterminate; I find it more or less equally easy to make arguments both 
for and against the citation of foreign law within either modality. I would 
suggest that one who wants to argue for the propriety of citing foreign 
law will be able to mobilize arguments of various degrees of 
persuasiveness within any modality; one who argues against the practice 
can do the same.  
On an individual level, whether a constitutional interpreter, lay or 
professional, concludes that citing foreign law is a legitimate practice in 
which judges may engage is a function of what sorts of arguments one 
personally finds persuasive or aesthetically appealing. These preferences, 
in turn, probably speak more about the interpreter than about any 
objective truth regarding the practice’s propriety. With respect to this 
debate in particular, as with all constitutional debates, the existence of 
conflicts between and within the modal forms creates opportunity for 
decisions that are acts of conscience. The choice an interpreter makes 
when confronted with that opportunity doesn’t say anything objectively 
true about the world, but only about the interpreter. 
That said, I will make a few observations about the results of this 
survey, or at least, about how I understand them. It seems to me that 
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textualism presents a fairly strong case for the citation of foreign law, but 
only for a particular usage of it. I perceive no strong textual argument for 
citing foreign law as controlling authority in a case. The open-
texturedness of language seems to invite only the citation of foreign law 
in a persuasive manner, as one resource among many possible 
alternatives to which an interpreter may make recourse in order to 
construe an ambiguous or indefinite textual provision. Likewise, 
historicism provides a strong case for citing foreign law, but the early 
judicial decisions in which foreign law was used cited it likewise in what 
I would describe as more of a persuasive sense than a binding sense.  
As for doctrinalism, despite what some critics fear, the usages of 
foreign law within the U.S. Reports seems mostly confined to the 
persuasive category—no recent Supreme Court decision of which I am 
aware has cited foreign law as binding authority on American courts. 
Meanwhile, the most fully-thought-out argument for citing foreign law as 
binding authority—the doctrinal need to bring American law into 
alignment with the law of other nations so that like cases will be treated 
alike worldwide—is also, in my mind, at least, the most obviously 
problematic; many would strongly deny, for reasons ranging from legal 
positivism to American sovereignty, that any such need actually exists. 
Prudential arguments for the citation of foreign law also seem to apply 
only to the use of foreign law as persuasive authority, furnishing 
reasoning that judges may choose to adopt or reject to the degree to 
which they find them compelling; the citation of foreign law as binding 
authority exacerbates the problem of judicial overreach. 
In my mind, structuralism presents a powerful argument against the 
citation of foreign law, though once again, this argument has much 
weaker force with respect to the use of foreign law as persuasive rather 
than binding authority. Arguments against the citation of foreign law 
from ethos are so intertwined with and reflective of a deep moral 
intuition that reliance on foreign law, for at least some purposes, in 
incompatible with who we are as a people. But again, the force of this 
argument is greatly diminished when it is made with respect to citing 
foreign law as merely persuasive authority. 
Having surveyed what these six modalities have to say about the 
legitimacy of citing foreign law, one may well conclude that as a general 
matter, it is constitutionally legitimate to cite foreign law for persuasive 
purposes, but not as binding authority. Of course, other conclusions can 
be reached as well, but this seems like the one that provides the best fit 
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for full panoply of various modal arguments and counter-arguments that 
have been raised. At this point, it may be observed that almost nobody 
who defends the practice of using foreign law in American judicial 
decisions argues that it should be binding in any way on us;300 almost all 
merely suggest that it should be one source of persuasive authority 
among many, useful to the extent that it may provide judges with useful 
strands of reasoning, analogies, consequential illustrations, or other types 
of information. Given that this is so, the whole debate over citing foreign 
law seems overblown—perhaps we all actually disagree to a lesser extent 
than we think. 
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